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Abstract—This paper describes the evaluation of available
experimental boards, the comparison of their supported set
of experiments and other aspects. The second part of this
evaluation is focused on the design process of the PCB (Printed
Circuit Board) for an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array)
based cryptography environment suitable for evaluating the latest
trends in the IC (Integrated Circuit) security like Side–Channel
Attacks (SCA) or Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). It
leads to many criteria affecting the design process and also the
suitability for evaluating and measuring results of the attacks and
their countermeasures. The developed system should be open,
versatile and unrestricted by the U.S. law [1].
I. INTRODUCTION
Security issues (cryptanalysis and side-channel attacks) are
getting more and more important during last years. Nowadays,
current research on hardware security is focused on two
methods: how to decrease vulnerability of integrated circuits
to leak their secrets and how to devise methods of secure
authentication. For example, the Differential Power Analysis
(DPA) is probably the most efficient way to retrieve secrets
from ICs, and practically all security devices must include
some form of countermeasures. The representative example of
authentication (and also key generation) is PUF, the security
of which is widely discussed and attacks and countermeasures
are developed.
The progress of these technologies requires to teach fu-
ture hardware security engineers how to evaluate attacks
and countermeasures against attacks. Laboratory courses re-
quire [2] huge amount of (expensive) experimental boards like
SASEBO [4] or Evariste [5] project. PUF related research
requires the same or higher number of experimental boards.
Both of the goals require to design and create a low cost
development board equipped with a state of the art FPGA. The
board design process should reflect the needs of cryptographic
experiments and applications.
II. SUPPORTED EXPERIMENTS
In the following subsections, we will summarize the in-
tended experimental application fields of the development
board.
A. Power Analysis Attacks
Every digital circuit leaks some internal information via
its power consumption. Paul Kocher et al. [6] showed that by
power consumption measuring during cryptographic operations
and by analyzing these measurements, the secret key can be
discovered, even though the cipher is otherwise (mathemat-
ically) secure. In order to experiment with power analysis
attacks, a current measuring device (usually a resistor) is added
to a supply rail in order to measure the current consumption.
The power consumption is measured as a sequence of sam-
ples in time (a power trace) using a digital oscilloscope (see
Fig. 1), and the power traces are then transferred to a computer
for analysis. There are several methods for analyzing the power
traces. Simple power analysis (SPA) use a single power trace
to directly discover the secret key.
Fig. 1. The power trace example of the AES cipher [2].
Differential power analysis (DPA) uses multiple power
traces, each is measured for the encryption with different
(known) data [7]. The secret key is then derived part by
part using statistical methods (testing of hypotheses about the
values of the sub-keys). For each sub-key, all possible values
are analyzed, a hypothetical power consumption is computed
using the known data and a power model, and the correct one
is found by correlating the hypothetical consumption with the
measured consumption across all traces for some point in time.
B. Physically Unclonable Function (PUF)
The PUF [8] [9] is a challenge–response mechanism that
uses physical properties of integrated circuits (deviations in the
manufacturing process like unique delay of the logic circuits
paths in the each IC) to create a unique response that identifies
the IC conclusively. The fundamental principle of PUF is
shown in Fig. 2. The response can be used as a secret key
for the cryptography or memoryless key storage.
Fig. 2. The principle of the PUF with different responses (Rx) [9].
C. Cipher Implementation
An FPGA is a perfect tool for implementing of any cipher,
for example the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) cipher
(that can be attacked by the DPA method). Modern FPGAs are
using a hardcoded AES cipher block as a protection against
copying the FPGA bitstream [20]. We can also apply the
DPA [11] technique to attack the FPGA configuration and
bitstream loading block to retrieve the secret key for the
bitstream decryption.
D. FPGA Configuration and AES Decryption of the Bitstream
A modern FPGAs can use an AES cipher as a protection
against copying the FPGA bitstream [20]. We can also apply
the DPA [11] technique to attack the FPGA configuration
and bitstream loading block to retrieve the secret key for the
bitstream decryption.
E. SHA-1 Challenge – Response Authentication
The SHA–1 EEPROMs like Maxim Integrated DS2432
is predecessor (see Fig. 3) of the PUF technology used for
a bitstream authentication [21]. This SHA–1 EEPROM can be
also attacked like the PUF.
Fig. 3. The principle of the SHA-1 challenge – response authentication. [21]
F. Evaluating Quality of the TRNG
Random number generation is of critical importance
for many cryptographic methods and applications, such as
key generation, digital signature computation, and challenge-
response authentication. True random number generators
(TRNGs) rely on physical noise sources such as thermal noise,
phase jitter or metastability, from which they extract entropy
to produce a random bitstream. Some methods are suitable for
implementation in FPGAs, such as ring-oscillator based TRNG
[3].
III. AVAILABLE COMPETING PLATFORMS
In this section a brief comparison will be presented between
three similar projects (SASEBO [4], Evariste [5] and FO-
BOS [15]) focused on the creation of the unified environment
for testing, evaluating a measuring systems implementing
cryptographic hardware.
A. SASEBO
SASEBO [4] is the most complex project focused on
the cryptography providing a complete toolset of boards (see
Table I.), software and measuring equipment. There are seven
different SASEBO boards differing by the used chip (ASIC
or FPGA). The most of SASEBO boards (see Fig. 5) contains
one FPGA for interfacing PC over the USB port (trough a
dedicated chip) and control the dedicated ASIC/FPGA (up to
Xilinx Kintex-7) for cryptography purpose (a control – victim
schema is used, see Fig. 4).
TABLE I. COMPARISON OF THE SASEBO BOARDS [22]
Board Vendor Control Victim Year
SASEBO Xilinx XC2VP30 XC2VP7 2007
SASEBO–G Xilinx XC2VP30 XC2VP7 2008
SASEBO–GII Xilinx XC3S400A XC5VLX30 or LX50 2009
SASEBO–GIII Xilinx XC6SLX45 XC7K325T 2013
SASEBO–B Altera EP2S30F672C5N EP2S15F484C5N 2008
SASEBO–R ASIC XC2VP30 LSI 130nm process 2008
SASEBO–W Xilinx XC6SLX150 Smart Card socket 2012
Fig. 4. The control – victim block diagram
Control & cryptographic parts have separate power supplies
to limit the interference between them, but interference can
spread over the common ground. The cryptographic chip
usually has no decoupling capacitors (or a few positions for
mounting capacitors, but the number of positions is signif-
icantly lower than the amount recommended by the chip
vendor) reducing the average number of required measure-
ments for the DPA [12]. The biggest disadvantage of the
SASEBO boards are their price (approximately 1500$–2000$)
that prevent to equip each student with his own board. Fur-
ther disadvantages are lack of decoupling capacitors that are
mounted on commercial FPGA boards according to FPGA
vendor datasheet (we can’t simulate the real operating con-
ditions for the PUF).
B. Evariste II and Evariste III
The Evariste II project [5] is focused primarily on fair
benchmarking of true random number generators, but can also
be used for other purposes (see Fig. 6). There are 9 different
boards with different FPGA chips using the motherboard for
acquiring measured data. These boards have the same general
features like using linear low–noise power regulators to supply
voltage for the FPGA (Core, Auxiliary, I/O). Like in the
Fig. 5. The SASEBO–GIII board. [13].
SASEBO, the communication and data acquisition is provided
by the USB interface (Cypress FX2 – CY7C68013A), but
there is no control FPGA. The control and the interface part
is implemented in the measured FPGA. There is no isolation
from the communication IC (FX2) to prevent the interference.
Currently supported boards are in Table II.
Fig. 6. Setup of the Evariste II project. [14]
TABLE II. COMPARISON OF THE EVARISTE II AND III BOARDS [14]
Evariste II Modules
Board Vendor Chip
Cyclone III FPGA module v2.2 Altera EP3C25F256-C8
Cyclone III FPGA module v2.4 Altera EP3C25F256-C8
Arria II FPGA module v 1.0 Altera EP2AGX45CU17C6
Spartan 3 FPGA module v 2.1 Xilinx XC3S700AN
Virtex 5 FPGA module v 1.0b Xilinx XC5VLX30T
Fusion FPGA module v 2.0 Microsemi M7AFS600 FGG256X2
Evariste III Modules
Board Vendor Chip
Spartan 6 FPGA module v 1.0 Xilinx XC6FLX16
Cyclone V FPGA module v.CyV2 Altera 5CEBA4F17C8N
SmartFusion2 FPGA module v.1 Microsemi M2S025FGG484
C. FOBOS
The idea of FOBOS project [15] is an attempt to create
a unified environment for cryptographic purposes using ordi-
nary FPGA development boards widely used for teaching. All
twelve supported boards are in the university program of both
major FPGA vendors, Xilinx and Altera.
FOBOS shares the same idea of SASEBO (dual FPGA
system control–victim), but each part is created from an
individual development board. The effort is focused on saving
money by using ordinary boards to create a low–cost system.
In case that the university/laboratory doesn’t already have these
boards (see Table III.), the price for equipping students is high
(cheaper half of these boards are discontinued, second half is
expensive). There is no isolation to prevent noise from the
control system.
TABLE III. COMPARISON OF THE FOBOS BOARDS. [15]
FOBOS Control Boards
Board Chip Price
Nexys–2 XC3S500E 149 $ (Discontinued)
Nexys–3 XC6LX16 270 $
FOBOS Victim Board — Xilinx FPGA based
Board Vendor Chip
Spartan–3E Starter Kit XC3S500E 299 $ (Legacy)
Spartan–3E - 1600 DB XC3S1600E 225 $ (Discontinued)
Atlys XC6LX45 419 $ (Legacy)
Genesys XC5VLX50T 899 $ (Legacy)
ML605 XC6VLX240T 1995 $
KC705 XC7K325T 1695 $
FOBOS Victim Board — Altera FPGA based
Altera DE1 Cyclone II 2C20 150 $
Altera DE2-115 Cyclone IV EP4CE115 495 $
Cyclone III Starter Cyclone III EP3C25F324 200 $
Altera DE4 Stratix IV GX EP4SGX230 2995 $
IV. EXPERIMENTAL BOARD REQUIREMENTS
In this section we will discuss some requirements for the
PCB to support all mentioned goals [16]. Requirements for
one goal can be opposite for the another goal.
A. Simple / Differential Power Analysis (SPA/DPA)
The secret key is obtained by measuring the FPGA core
power consumption. From these measurements a power trace
waveform (representing voltage in the time) we will created,
from which the secret key can be determined. Two main
SPA/DPA requirements must be met: ability to measure the
current for the FPGA core (using a shunt resistor) and remove
decoupling capacitors for increasing current surges (voltage
peaks) that made the key recovery much easier (but not
impossible [17]). Additional requirements for attacking FPGA
configuration block are: presence of a (Quad) SPI Flash chip
as a bitstream storage and VBATT pin have to be connected out
onto a pin header (FPGA key storage is a volatile memory).
B. Physically Unclonable Function (PUF)
The result of PUF circuit prototype can vary due to
different operational conditions and other influences from the
environment surrounding the measured board. Parameters that
affect measurements outside the board are the change of the
operating temperature and EMI (Electro Magnetic Interfer-
ence) in the power supply source.
The most important parameter is the FPGA core voltage,
that can not be simply modified on an ordinary board and
should meet the requirements of the FPGA chip vendor (toler-
ance is typically 3%–5%). The core voltage of modern FPGAs
is usually 1 V, so the variance can be maximally 100 mV peak–
to–peak using a proper decoupling technique. A precise power
solution with a voltage control in the order of millivolts and
ability to change output voltage on–the–fly from the control
system is required. The solution should support a standardized
interconnection bus like an I2C or an SPI to support automated
measurements. The current required by a typical mid–range
FPGA core is 3–4 amperes, thus limits the choice.
C. Cipher Implementation in the FPGA
Asymmetric ciphers and methods need mostly more FPGA
resources than symmetric ones. The board (and FPGA foot-
print and pinout) should be the same for all chips across the
FPGA family. This allows to use smaller or bigger chips on
demand and modify the board price to reach expected budget.
D. General Requirement – EMC and Measurement Process
The general requirements also affect the final design of
the board. The most common one is to comply with the
EMC (Electro Magnetic Compatibility) requirements [18]. The
measured values can be jammed by other circuits placed on the
board. For example, Cypress FX2 (CY7C68013A) is widely
used for communication between PC and FPGA via USB. The
inner architecture of FX2 includes the 8051 microcontroller.
There is no way to be sure that the measured consumption (for
SPA/DPA) is from the FPGA only. Even FX2 is not sharing
power supplies with the FPGA, a noise from I/O pins can
cause a small interference in measured voltages.
This is an example based on our research [2] with Evariste
boards where the Cypress FX2 circuit is used. We are able
to retrieve the AES secret key no matter how the AES were
calculated because the power activity of the FX2 is higher than
the power activity of the measured FPGA. To lower the system
noise, optocouplers circuits should be used to divide the board
to an FPGA part and the interface part. The control will be
provided by a control application on PC.
V. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL BOARD
A. System Partitioning
The cost of the designed system can be reduced in different
ways. The first idea is not to use the control–victim schema
like SASEBO or FOBOS. The price goes down by removing
one FPGA chip (one development board), so we got inspired
by the Evariste project. The save of one FPGA will reduce
the board size and might allow to use a lower count of PCB
layers.
B. FPGA
The majority of the mentioned boards from all projects are
based on the Xilinx Spartan-3E technology. On the other hand,
there are only two boards equipped with a state of the art FPGA
like Xilinx Kintex-7. The final board should contain a modern
FPGA. Xilinx provides a cheaper alternative to Kintex-7 called
Artix-7, based on same technology with similar features. Artix-
7 FPGAs are available in many packages, but the FT256
package is the only one that met the requirements (4 layer
PCB, variety of available chips).
C. FPGA Core Voltage Power Solution
We have selected an Artix-7 FPGA (model XC7A100T)
as a maximum configuration. This requires a power supply
that can deliver up to 3 A. We got our attention by the
Texas Instrument TPS62360 chip [19]. The TPS62360 key
features are programmable output voltage (0.77 V–1.4 V via
I2C interface in 10 mV steps) and differential load sensing
for precise output voltage accuracy (less than 0.5%). The
functional diagram is depicted in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. The functional diagram of the Texas Instrument TPS62360 [19].
D. Interface Part
The interface part should support the I2C bus (due to the
selected power supply) and one usual communication protocol
for interacting the board by the PC. An UART interface
was chosen for its simplicity to reduce the number of the
optocouplers (thus the board complexity). The FTDI FT2232H
chip supports both interfaces using only one chip. The interface
part and the FPGA part are isolated by the bi-directional
optocouplers for an I2C and an UART and isolation can be
increased by removing thin stripes of the soldermask from both
sides to decrease capacitive binding and leakage currents.
E. Measurement of the FPGA Core Voltage
This requirement can be solved by adding a high accuracy
shunt resistor with two SMA connectors (before and after
the shunt resistor). SMA connectors were chosen for an easy
connection between the board and an oscilloscope (or an ADC
card). Traces between the shunt resistor and SMAs are routed
to 50 ohm impedance to match oscilloscope probes. Using
both SMA connectors makes possible to add a differential
operational amplifier and we also provided a pin header for
this feature.
F. Customization Options for Specific Needs
The board is designed to use SMD (Surface Mount De-
vices) with reasonable dimensions for hand soldering. All
discrete parts are in 0603 (or larger) package with exception
of the decoupling capacitors under the FPGA (0402 package)
and can be easily added/removed by hot air gun and tweezers
according to measured experiments. Unused FPGA pins can
be connected to pin headers. A differential pairs are more
universal for the future board extension. We can use a cheap
motherboard like the Evariste project that provides LEDs,
buttons, switches, displays, etc. for educational purposes for
teaching digital design in a general way.
VI. PRICE CALCULATION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL BOARD
The experimental board is designed (see Fig. 8 and Fig. 9)
for small batch production of 30 boards. The board outline
is the same as the smart card dimensions thus the area of
the board is 7.17 square inch (46.25 cm2). The BGA (Ball
Grid Array) packages require an ENIG (Electroless Nickel
Immersion Gold) surface finishing. The board price is 11$
including a stencil.
The components price depends on the used FPGA. For our
needs the Artix-7 35T (XC7A35T-1FTG256C) is sufficient and
the cost is 25$ only. The price for all remaining components
is 95$ and the cost of the assembly process is 34$ per
board. The cost of the assembled board is approximately 165$
(respectively 200$ including VAT and other charges) that is
significantly below the price of competitor boards (SASEBO
1500$, Evariste 500$, FOBOS 1000$) with the same or more
features supported. The total price will be even lower thanks
to discounts (25%) for chips applied from 10–25 chips.
VII. CONCLUSION
We evaluated three different projects (SASEBO, Evariste,
FOBOS) focused on measuring and evaluating cryptographic
applications in hardware (FPGA). We described their ad-
vantages and disadvantages (the spread of the EMI to the
measured part because of no isolation between the control
part and measured part) and we summarized a state of the art
(requirements) for a new low–cost FPGA board (and effects
of these requirements).
The board has been designed to be versatile and
universal for evaluating various cryptographic techniques
(PUF, SPA, DPA, cipher implementation and others at-
tacks/countermeasures) and is the only board supporting the
SPA/DPA and the PUF evaluation at the same board. The
board is fully operational and we delivered a state of the art
FPGA (Xilinx Artix-7) equipped board to researchers, teachers
and student regardless of low cost demands. The board is
further easily customizable to extend the range of possible
experiments with a basic soldering equipment.
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